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In this paper we construct a theory about how the expansion of higher education
could be associated with several factors that indicate a decrease in the quality of
degrees. We assume that the expansion of tertiary education takes place through
three channels and show how they are likely to reduce average study time, academic
requirements and average wages, and to inate grades.
Firstly, universities have an incentive to increase their student body through pub-
lic and private funding schemes beyond a level where they can keep their academic
requirements high. Secondly, due to skill-biased technological change, employers have
the incentive to recruit sta¤ with a higher education degree. Thirdly, students have
the incentive to acquire a college degree due to employerspreferences for higher ed-
ucational attainment, the university application rules and through the growing social
value placed on education.
We develop a parsimonious dynamic model in which a student, a college and an
employer repeatedly make decisions about requirement levels, performance and wage
levels. Our model shows that if i) universities have the incentive to decrease entrance
requirements, ii) employers are more likely to employ sta¤ with a higher education
degree and iii) all types of students enrol in colleges, the nal grade will not neces-
sarily act as a mechanism to induce weaker students to study more to catch up with
more able students. In order to re-establish a quality-guarantee mechanism, entrance
requirements should be set at a higher level.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we study how the expansion of higher education can result in a decline in
the quality of degrees. We measure the quality of degrees through studying time, academic
requirements, average wages and the signalling power of grades (which is reduced through
grade ination).
The issue of studying time as an indicator of quality in degrees has recently gained
attention. In the United States a decline in full-time college studentsstudying time has
been observed empirically and has itself become a subject, both academically and politically
(Arum and Roksa 2011; Babcock and Marks 2010a and Babcock and Marks 2010b; OECD
2012; The Economist 2012; De Vise 2012a and b1). Hall (2010) and McInnis and Hartley
(2002) nd that studying time is decreasing in Australia too. The decrease in studying time in
Europe has been less the focus of study than in the US. Most academic and public debate on
a possible decline in studying time is national but involves comparison with other European
countries (Bekhradnia 2012; Sastry and Bekhradnia 2007; Bekhradnia 2012; Eurostudent
2005, 2008, 2012; BBC news 2007; The Irish Times 2012; Halloran 2011; Robatham 2013).
Moreau and Leathwood (2006) nd that studentsengagement in paid work has increased in
England. Bekhradnia (2012:7) nds that in the UK degrees take less time to complete than
those in continental Europe and that less time is spent studying per week; a characteristic
that mainly seems to apply to post-1992 universities, according to Bekhradnia (2012).
Reduced studying time has been associated with improved learning technology (Babcock
and Marks 2010a,b, Darmody and Smyth 2008, Fischer 2011, Gomis-Porqueras et al 2011).
However, Babcock and Marks (2010 a, b) note that this can only be part of the reason.
Dolton, Marcenaro and Navarro (2003) conrm this by showing that time spent in formal
university study is positively related to student performance. Another identied reason is the
growing nancial pressure on students: as tuition fees increase more students work and thus
spend less time studying (Ba¤oe-Bonnie and Golden 2007; Hall 2010; Purcell 2010; Moreau
and Leathwood 2006 and McCaig 2011; Manthei and Gilmore 2005). Findings indicate that
there was an increase in part-time over full-time students, especially in Europe. Hakkinen
(2006) nds that in Finland 50% of students were working in 2000, which increased the
time-to-degree. Working students spent 19 hours per week studying whereas non-working
students spent 35 hours per week studying. Eurostudent (2005) nds that more than 50% of
students in Europe are employed. In the Netherlands and Estonia the student employment
rate is two-thirds. At the same time Eurostudent (2005) provides evidence that students
who work for 11 to 15 hours a week spend less time studying. In Germany and Romania
the impact is seven hours less and in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Lithuania one hour
less. Babcock and Marks (2010 a,b) show that even when controlling for part-time students
by studying only full-time students, studying time still declines. The increase in part-time
students alone therefore does not seem to be a su¢ cient explanation for the decrease in
studying time.
Most of the prominent work in the relevant US literature associates declining studying
1The amount of time US secondary students spend on homework has changed very little in the last 20
years. At high school, students did not study more in the 1940s than they did in the 1960-80s (Gill and
Schlossmann 2003). However, according to Larson (2001), American children and adolescents spend less
time on homework than their Asian or European counterparts and have more free time.
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time with a decrease in college requirements and standards. This decrease arises from a set
of reasons related to a more vulnerable position of faculty sta¤ (Brint 2011; Clotfelter, 2011;
Arum and Roksa 2011; Bok 2006; Johnson 20002; Babcock and Marks 20101; Fischer 2011;
Clack 2011): the amount of temporary positions as opposed to permanent positions has
increased, publication pressure has risen and student evaluations matter more in securing
an academic job. Grade ination has also been documented and associated with decreasing
studying time (Johnson 2003; Rojstaczer 2011; Rojstaczer and Healey 2010). The decline in
studying time has also been associated with the fact that college enrolment rates increase
and less prepared, less motivated students enter campus (Brint 2011, Bound, Lovenheim and
Turner 2009; Clack 2011).
Notwithstanding the wide array of factors that were considered as determinants for the
decline in studying time, the increase in college enrolment rates has been accorded less
importance in the debate about quality of degrees, but  taken together with a decrease
in college requirements  it may have a considerable impact on the time spent studying
(Briggs 2010). Indeed, Briggs (2010) predicts a decline in the number of average hours spent
studying as the share of students entering college increases, but he has not given a clear
theory on how this could actually happen.
The contribution of this paper is to provide a theoretical reasoning of how the expansion of
tertiary education together with a decrease in college requirements could decrease average
time spent studying, average wages attributed to college graduates and contribute to grade
ination. We propose a model in which a university, multiple employers and a student can
play a dynamic game with incomplete information. We focus on the undergraduate tertiary
level of education since universities are ranked according to teaching quality, entry and
achievement requirements and future employability of students2. In our model, expansion
of education reduces average studying time because expansion turns out to be a low-ability
expansion (the number of low-ability students accepted to university, whose studying time
is zero, increases while the number of high-ability students stays the same). Machin and
McNally (2007:11) already raise this possibility. An expansion towards more low-ability
students entering college could be taking place because 1) college requirements decrease
because universities are setting requirements that will maximise the pool of students, 2) all
students are better o¤ if they get accepted to a university with a high rank and 3) employers
are more likely to employ highly skilled individuals3. Our model shows that under these
three conditions, the grade will not necessarily act as a mechanism to make weaker students
study to catch up with more able students. In order to re-establish a quality guarantee
mechanism, entry requirements should be set at a higher level.
We choose the UK as an empirical example of our model since students there seem to
spend little time studying compared to their continental European counterparts (Eurostudent
2011 and Bekhradnia 2012).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: the following section provides empir-
ical evidence of tertiary education expansion and decline in the quality of higher education
in the UK. Section 3 delineates the theoretical background for our model. Section 4 presents
2With respect to the ranking of universities, we do not address such factors as diversity of faculty research
prole, faculty publications and citations, which are relevant determinants for the graduate programs.
3By highly skilledindividuals we mean those with a university degree.
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the theoretical model and its assumptions. Section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical Evidence
In this section we provide empirical evidence on the expansion of tertiary education in the
UK since 1950 compared to other European countries, using several indicators of quality
of higher education (as mentioned above these are studying time, academic requirements,
average wages and the signalling power of grades)in order to empirically support the key
variables in our model. In this section we focus on the United Kingdom since students in
the United Kingdom seem to be spending little time studying compared to their continental
European counterparts (Eurostudent 2011 and Bekhradnia 2012). Furthermore, universities
in the United Kingdom might be more strongly a¤ected by the need for a large number
of students than continental European universities. The reason for this is that the United
Kingdom is among the countries with the largest share of private funding through student
fees with 263 in 2009 (Estermann and Pruvot 2011).
2.1 Enrolment in higher education
The expansion of tertiary education needed to be preceded by the universalisation of upper
secondary education (Beblavy et al 2012:2). The US was the leading country in the expansion
and universalisation4 of upper secondary education in the 20th century. US enrolment rates
in the upper secondary sector rose from 18% in 1910 to 73% in 1940 (Goldin 1998:347).
Europe followed this example around 30 years later in the form of government e¤orts to
make upper secondary education available to the masses (Beblavy 2012:2). As a consequence,
tertiary education could equally expand (for an excellent review of this expansion see Trow
2007 or Schofer and Meyer 2005) a phenomenon observed across Europe at di¤erent rates
since the 1970s or 1980s (OECD 2012, Eurostat 2006 and Machin and McNally 2007). The
OECD (2012:9) measures that in 2012 over 503 of university-age young adults are enrolled
in higher education in OECD countries. Eurostat (2006) shows that between 1998 and 2006,
the number of students enrolled in tertiary education rose from 15 million to 19 million in
the EU-27 area. Bratti and de Blasio (2008) provide evidence for Italy. Beblavy et al (2012)
provide evidence for increasing enrolment in tertiary education in Germany, Slovakia, Czech
Republic, Spain, the United Kingdom and Sweden5. In Figure 1 we show enrolment rates in
tertiary education in the UK. We can see that enrolment in higher education increased only
slightly between 1953 and 1989 but then surged very quickly and grew by about 400% from
5 to 25%. Compared to certain other European countries, expansion in the UK happened
rather abruptly as well as rather late. As Figures 2 to 5 show, the expansion of tertiary
education occurred at di¤erent speeds and dynamics across the various countries. Whereas
we can observe a rather steady increase in tertiary enrolment rates in Sweden, the expansion
in Spain happened more rapidly and more steeply.
4Beblavy et al (2012) dene an expansion of education that passes the 80 percent threshold as univer-
salisation.
5The graphs show net or gross enrollment rates in tertiary education.
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Figure 1: Enrolment rates in tertiary education in the United Kingdom 1953-2009 in percent,
Source: Toubeau (2012)
Figure 2: Enrolment rates in tertiary education in Spain 1944-2009 in percent, Source:
Pensiero (2012)
2.2 Quality of tertiary degrees
As mentioned at the beginning of this paper and of this section, we measure the quality
of higher education degrees through four elements: studying time, colleges academic re-
quirements, average wages and the signalling powerof grades. In this section we provide
empirical evidence on studying time, academic requirements and the signalling power of
grades (though examining grade ination). We do not analyse wage development in the
United Kingdom and leave this discussion to our theoretical model.
Studying time of full-time students decreased in the US from 40 hours a week in 1961 to
27 hours a week in 2007 as Babcock and Marks (2010) show. In Europe, there are no such
clear-cut numbers. Europe shows a high heterogeneity across countries in the time students
spend studying (Eurostudent 2005, 2008, 2011)6. According to the Eurostudent ndings,
time devoted to studying (classroom time and personal study time) ranges, on the Bachelor
6Heterogeneity can also be measured across subjects as well as across universities (Bekhradnia 2012).
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Figure 3: Enrolment rates in tertiary education in Sweden 1940-2002 in percent, Source:
Peterson (2012)
Figure 4: Enrolment rates in tertiary education in Germany 1950-2011 in percent, Source:
Thum and Potjagailo (2012)
level, from 31 hours in France to 38 hours in Italy, and on Master level from 23 hours in
Romania to 39 hours in Sweden. Sastry and Bekhradnia (2007) nd that university students
in the UK spend 26 hours on teaching and private study in 2006. In Germany, however,
a survey of 1000 students in the state of Hessen state that they spend 35 hours for their
studies in 2012 (Sparda Bank 2013). These ndings are conrmed by Eurostudent (2011)
but are challenged by Schulmeister and Metzger (2011) who nd that students in Hamburg
studied only 26 hours in 2009. How these numbers di¤er from the past is not clear.
National evidence from the UK attests tothe fact that standards are declining at univer-
sities there (University World News 2008, The Guardian 2010). Based mainly on qualitative
research, House of Commons (2008-2009) nds that stakeholders and of higher education
institutional actors in the UK believe that standards at university have worsened: a univer-
sity degree is seen as being worth less than before by employers, students and academics.
In the report, employers speak of their observation that students appear to be less moti-
vated and have a less than ideal learning approach. Employers are said to focus more now
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Figure 5: Decreasing enrolment requirement at university in UK for females - males follow a
similar pattern (1996-2001), Source: Abbott and Leslie (2004) in Toubeau (2012), database
Universities and Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS)
on previous work experience than on degrees when selecting job candidates. Students are
quoted as saying that what they had been taught at school early on was now being taught at
university (ibid: 112). Academics believe that certain degrees have lost value compared to
ve, ten or twenty years ago; essays have declined in quality and students appear to be less
well selected (House of Commons 2008-2009: 111). In fact, as shown in Figure 6, require-
ments to enter college have decreased as acceptance rates have an increasing trend. One
reason for these higher acceptance rates may be an issue tackled by the House of Commons
(2008-2009), which provides evidence of academic sta¤s interest to increase the number of
students admitted7.
Evidence on grade ination in the US has been provided by Rojstaczer and Healey (2010)
and Rojstaczer (2011), who show that 43% of grades at four-year universities are As. This
signies an increase of 28 percentage points since 1960. In the UK, based on the annually
collected Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) student record, the House of Commons
(2008-2009) nds that between 1994 and 2008 the good honours degrees understood as an
upper second or a rst class honours degree has risen. Yorke (2009) nds that between
1994 and 2002 this rise was most concentrated in the elite Russell Groupuniversities and
between 2002 and 2007 the rise was more evenly spread. Among other reasons Yorke, in
House of Commons (2008-2009), gives as explanations for an improvement in grades the
fact that there might have been changes in the student entry prole of higher education
institutions. This has not been empirically proven, however.
7A quote on funding issues by academics is given in House of Commons (2008-2009): "More particularly it
relates to a tacit understanding amongst university sta¤ that assessment levels and methods shall be geared
mainly, if not exclusively, to the need to retain as many students as possible for the subsequent years and
for graduation."
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Figure 6: Decreasing enrolment requirement at university in UK for females - males follow a
similar pattern (1996-2001), Source: Abbott and Leslie (2004) in Toubeau (2012), database
Universities and Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS)
3 Theoretical Background
In this section we discuss various economic theories that form the backbone of the model
presented in section 4. Our model is characterised by three distinguishing features that
explain the expansion of tertiary education. We show how education expansion may lead to
a potential decrease in studying e¤ort under certain circumstances:
1. The value of high skills on the labour market: employers employ only students who
went to university - there is a quest for highly skilled individuals. It is important to
note here that by "highly skilled" individuals we refer to those who went to university.
They can be of low or high (innate) ability.
2. The role of universities and the value of expansion: universities maximise the number
of students accepted since funding obtained by university increases with the number
of students.
3. The rising importance of university degrees: all potential students are strictly better
o¤ if they get accepted to university and if the ranking of this university is high enough
to guarantee them a job.
Below we describe the theoretical basis for each of these features of the model.
3.1 The value of high skills on the labour market
The employer employs only students with high skills. He or she is modelled based on a
screening model (Stiglitz 1975; Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976; Arrow 1973 and Wiles 1974) -
an education economic model in which the employer is mainly interested in high educational
attainment when making hiring decisions on a potential employee. In a screening model the
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Figure 7: Percentage of upper class rst class grades awarded by higher education institutes
in the United Kingdom, Source: Higher Education Statistics Agency
employer cannot observe the actual ability of potential employees and he or she therefore
screens applicants according to their educational attainment to determine an applicants
ability of learning. Hiring applicants with university degrees reduces the employers risk
of hiring someone with a diminished capacity for learning. Implicit characteristics of this
model, upon which results are dependent, are: (1) students with higher ability are better in
absolute terms; the ranking of abilities is unambiguous (such screening is called hierarchical),
(2) labour supply is inelastic, (3) individuals have perfect information on their own abil-
ities, (4) on-the-job screening is not possible, (5) screening is exact, (6) the information
acquired is general, in the sense that it is not rm specic (Stiglitz 1975:286). In the screen-
ing model as in Stiglitz (1975) there can be a separating equilibrium or a pooling equilib-
rium8 the latter characterises a situation in which all workers receive the same average wage
whereas the former characterises a situation in which high ability types receive a high wage
and low ability types receive a low wage. In both types of equilibria the existence of the
low ability type decreases the net income of the high ability type and the existence of the
high ability type will provide the low ability type with at least his or her marginal product
(Stiglitz 1975:285). The screening model has several implications: rstly, social returns di¤er
from private returns and are not necessarily positive in the presence of screening. In fact,
screening may tend to lead to higher inequality even if the screening mechanism increases
the productivity of rms (Stiglitz 1975:299). There is thus a trade-o¤ between distributive
versus productivity concerns. Secondly, there is a tendency to over-invest in education, espe-
cially in publicly funded schools: education serves mainly as a signal and therefore education
systems should choose the least costly method of transmitting this signal. In consequence,
the screening model is often used as a theoretical basis to decrease public spending on educa-
tion (Quiggin 1999). Huang and Capelli (2001), Bedard (2001) and Weiss (1995) o¤er some
empirical evidence of the model and of the importance of higher education for employers.
In our model we add compared to the Stiglitz and Rothschild (1976) model a new
8In Rothshild and Stiglitz(1976) screening model the authors show that only the separating equilibrium
exists. Similarly, in our model we show that the pooling equilibrium does not exist.
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decision-maker, the university, whose requirements a¤ect both the wage contract and study-
ing time. However, given university requirements, the interaction between the students and
the employers in each period t is similar to that in other standard models of screening and
there is a unique symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium (SPBE).11 We are interested in
comparative statics, focusing on the e¤ects of university requirements on studentsequilib-
rium studying time, grades and wages. As a further extension in comparison with Stiglitz
(1975), we consider an interaction between the decision-makers that is repeated over time,
with a new student taking decisions in every period. The equilibrium of this repeated inter-
action is then dened as a set of playersstrategies and beliefs that constitute an SPBE in
each period.
The fact that university degrees determine employment and the wage contract can be
bedded into a wider (sociological) theory about the expansion of higher education. Theories
about the expansion of tertiary education being linked to economic development (reected
by the employersinterests described above) are termed as socioeconomic functionalist expla-
nations (Beblavy et al. 2012:3). These theories are based on the fact that national economic
development creates demand for skills and supply is given through resources created through
economic development (Collins 1971; Goldin 1998). This assumption is in line with recent
ndings and predictions that high skills matter and will matter most on the labour market
(CEDEFOP 2010).
3.2 The role of universities and the value of expansion
We consider universities as public institutions providing education and making choices ac-
cording to public choice theory: in public choice models, it is usually assumed that heads of
public institutions aim to maximise their own utility. They will promote the benets of the
institutions only in a way that it is benecial to them personally. Niskanen (1968) argues
that heads of institutions will benet from expansion of their institutions beyond the social
optimum. A reason why managers of educational institutions will benet from an expansion
of their institution stems from not-for-prot (NFP) theory (Holland and Ritvo 2008). NFP
theory concerns institutions that do not distribute surplus revenues as dividends or prot,
such as universities. Surplus revenues should be kept in the institution to serve its goals.
Not-for-prot theory states that in the absence of a prot motive, NFPs tend to expand
since that is the way for managers to increase their prestige and personal perquisites. It
is therefore not necessary for the income of universities to expand linearly with number of
students - it may if students pay tuition or if state pays per student - but even if there
are more complicated funding mechanisms, if they lead to immediate or eventual expansion
of university budget following an increase in number of students, our condition is satised
so that a linear assumption about the correlation of university funds with the number of
students is an acceptable approximation.
3.3 The growing importance of university degrees
The assumption that all potential students are strictly better o¤ if they get accepted to
university is based on the features of the labour market, the fact that universities do have
the incentive to take up as many students as the government quota or university capacity 
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allows and the fact that the social reputation of a university degree has risen with the opening
of universities to a larger population. Rubinson and Fuller (1992) show that educational
expansion has also occurred as a result of education having become a status symbol. This
theoretical explanation for the expansion of tertiary education can be termed sociological
or conict, competition and organisation theory (Beblavy et al 2012:3). These theories put
less emphasis on market powers as an explanatory factor but rather emphasise social status.
Due to competition between di¤erent status groups for success in education, the expansion of
education rises beyond purely functional requirements (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977; Collins
1971 and 1979). In times of high competition among social status groups, as can be the case
with a rising population, expansion should be more rapid than in times with less competition
(Rubinson and Fuller 1992).
4 The Model
In this section we construct a parsimonious model to explore theoretically how the expansion
of tertiary education can decrease studying time.
Consider the following dynamic model. There are three essential entities that make
decisions: a student with ability a that is distributed according to a probability distribution
function (p.d.f.) f with support [a; a], a university and employers. Implicitly, there is also
a fourth party a government or an education authority that imposes restrictions on the
university by setting (a) the maximal increment in the number of students per period (the
quota of students) and (b) a rank condition according to which an expansion of the student
pool at the university is only allowed if the rank of the university exceeds a certain threshold.
In the model, we take the quota of incoming students and the threshold for the rank as given
and xed over time, so that there is no active role for the government.
Time is discrete, t 2 f1; 2; :::g, and the three decision makers interact repeatedly over
time. Each time period a new cohort of students substitutes the previous, so that a new
representative student makes decisions at each time t. The timing of events is the following:
1. the university sets the level of requirements, rt, that determines the entry conditions
and the grades;
2. M employers simultaneously select a wage contract, given the university requirements
and the grades;
3. students with ability high enough to be accepted to the university choose the studying
e¤ort.
Below we describe each of these steps and the interaction between the decisions of the
university, students and the employers in more detail. First, the university sets the level of
requirements, rt, that determines the entry conditions and the grades. Only students with
ability a > rt pass the entry requirements and get accepted to the university. Upon accep-
tance they can guarantee themselves a positive level of utility, provided that the rank of the
university is higher than a certain threshold (below which the wages are zero). Other poten-
tial students, with abilities below rt, are not accepted and make no study-related decisions;
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their utility is set to be zero. Thus, all potential students are strictly better o¤ if they get
accepted to the university when the rank of the university is high enough to guarantee them
a job, and hence the student pool in this case is represented by all students with abilities in
(rt; a]. Suppose that at t = 1, a r1 < a. This initial value of requirements is set arbitrarily
within the specied range and determines the initial pool of students, N1. To make things
interesting though we assume that r1 is large enough so that the rank of the university at
t = 1 is above the threshold R set by the authorities; this condition is formally stated and
discussed below.9 At any t  2 the requirements, rt, are chosen by the university so as to
maximize the pool of students, Nt, within the quota assigned by the authorities. Implicit
in this is the idea that the larger the number of students, the larger the funding that the
university obtains, either on a public or on a private basis. For this reason the university has
an incentive to reduce its requirements and accept all students within the quota. Yet, it can
only do so as long as with the new reduced standards its rank, Rt(rt), is above the threshold
R set by the authorities. One can think of this as a situation where the authorities care
about prestige of the university and in order to promote high standards, they only allow the
university to expand when its rank is higher than a certain level.10
When the time t requirements are set, the grade of a student with ability a is determined
by
gt = maxfsta  rt; 0g
where st is the studying time.
Next, M independent employers simultaneously choose the wage contract. They only
employ people who went to the university (students with abilities above rt), conditional on
the fact that the university rank is above the publicly known threshold, that is, Rt  R. If
Rt < R, the employers do not employ anyone. The employers are willing to employ students
with abilities above a certain level A at wage wHt, and those with abilities below A at wage
wLt, where wHt > wLt.11 However, the employers do not observe the abilities of students
and can only judge them from the grades. They select the wage contracts that may pool
or separate high- and low-ability students, depending on the employersbeliefs about which
types of students will choose which grade. The wage levels, wHt and wLt are determined via
a standard Bertrand competition12 between employers. Moreover, only two di¤erent wages
may exist in equilibrium since as we will show, only two di¤erent grades signals of ability,
may be observed.
Finally, given the university requirements and the wage contracts of the employers, a
student of any ability a decides how much time to allocate to studying. Studying more
improves the grade and this may increase the wage if the wage contracts of the employers
are designed to separate high- and low-ability students; if the wage contracts are pooling,
studying time does not a¤ect the wage. Also, studying reduces the leisure time. The students
9See (1).
10Notice that even without the prescription from the authorities, the university can only guarantee itself a
positive number of students if its rank is above R. For instance, when students are obliged to pay an amount
" > 0 for their education, no one would apply to the university if the rank is below R. This is clear from the
specication of students preferences and wages described below.
11We assume the most interesting scenario, when r1 < A < a.
12In a Bertrand competition, sellers set prices simultaneously (in our case the employers set wages). Buyers
take these prices as given and set quantities (in our case students set e¤ort).
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utility is increasing in wage and in leisure; therefore, the choice of the amount of studying
time depends crucially on the type of the wage contract  pooling or separating. If the
contract is pooling, all students tend to choose the same studying time, minimal that is
required to receive the grade that grants the employment. If the contract is separating, then
high-ability students study more because for them the returns to studying are higher.
More formally, the dilemmas faced at each time period by the university, employers and
students, in their chronological order, are described below.
4.1 University decision making
The universitys funding is proportional to the number of students. In fact, assuming that
the tuition fee per student or a government subsidy per student is xed at a certain level p,
the total tuition fee or subsidy that the university obtains at time t is p  Nt, where Nt is
the number of students. Therefore, the goal of the university at any period t is to maximize
the size of its student pool13. However, two restrictions are imposed externally. First, at
any requirements level set by the university, its rank, Rt, should not fall below R, the xed
given constant. We will refer to Rt  R as the rank condition. Secondly, at each time t the
student pool cannot be increased by more than 
a a , the quota extension for the total number
of students. This second restriction can arise as a result of regulation by the government
or the education authority or it can simply reect facility constraints at the university, that
is unable to extend its studying facilities (such as computers, libraries, study materials and
space) faster than at a certain rate. Naturally, 
a a should not exceed 1 N1.
Thus, the university chooses its requirements rt at time t with the objective to expand
its student pool subject to two constraints:
Nt(rt) ! max
rt
s.t. Nt  Nt 1(rt 1) + 
a  a
Rt(rt)  R
where
Nt =
Z a
rt
f(a)da
and
Rt(rt) = 
T
Nt
+ rt + Avwt + 
The denition of the rank accounts for the teaching quality as captured by T
Nt
the ratio of
the number of teachers to the number of students (T < 1 and reasonably T < N1, the initial
number of students), the level of entry and grade requirements, rt, the employment prospects
of time t student cohort as captured by the average wage, Avwt, and other factors included
in constant term . The weights ,  and  are all positive constants and + +  < 1. The
value of R is arbitrary; however, the interesting case is when it is neither too high, nor too
low. Namely, assume that R is such that a) initially, at t = 1 the rank condition is satised,
13This assumption is consistent with empirical obseravations delineated in Section 2.
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that is R1(r1) > R (in fact, let R1(r1)  R), and b) if requirements decline to the lowest
possible level, rt = a, when all students are accepted to the university, the rank condition
does not hold, Rt(a) < R. Given the denition of the rank above and using the expression
for the average wage that will be derived later, this means that
T+a+
wHta  wLta  A(wHt   wLt)
a  a + < R T
a  a
a  r1 +r1+
wHta  wLtr1   A(wHt   wLt)
a  r1 +
(1)
4.2 Employersdecision making
There are M independent employers in the market. For simplicity assume that M = 2; the
analysis for M > 2 can be easily extended. The employers have identical technology that is
characterized by the feature that all workers with ability above A (high-ability workers) can
perform the work that entitles them to the same wage wHt. Also, all workers with ability
below A (low-ability workers) can do the work that entitles them to the same wage wLt.
Assume that r1 < A < a. In equilibrium, each employer seeks to maximize his expected
prot, equal to the expected work productivity of the employee net of the wage payment.
We assume that the work productivity of a high-ability individual is equal to his ability
times constant factor xH and the work productivity of a low-ability individual is equal to
his ability times constant factor xL. We consider xL  xH to make sure that the work
productivity (and the equilibrium wage) of a high-ability individual is higher than the work
productivity (and the equilibrium wage) of a low-ability individual. The wages wHt and wLt
are determined endogenously, via standard Bertrand competition between the employers.
Since the ability is not observable by the employers, they form beliefs about the abil-
ity based on the grade that the job applicant receives at the university. That is, having
observed the grade gt, the employers assign some probability to the fact that the worker
is of high-ability type (even for o¤-the-equilibrium path choices of gt). Given these beliefs,
the employers design the wage contract that either "pools" or "separates" di¤erent types of
workers, so that wages are allocated to workers consistently with the beliefs.
Consider rst the following beliefs of the employers:
 gt  gt corresponds to a  A
 gt < gt corresponds to a < A
for some threshold grade gt. These beliefs lead to a separating contract that o¤ers the
high wage wHt to anyone with the grade gt  gt and the low wage wLt to anyone with
the grade gt < gt. Later, in section 5, we show that the separating beliefs of the type
described above, with a uniquely dened level of gt, are actually the only equilibrium beliefs
of employers.
Moreover, the employment takes place and the wages are paid only if the rank condition
is satised, Rt  R. If it is not satised, the employers are not interested in employing
anyone (wages are zero).
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4.3 Student decision making
Given the wage contract of the employers, a representative student with ability a > rt who is
accepted to college at time t, chooses the time for study and for leisure with the objective to
maximize his or her utility at time t. If the wage contract is separating, of the type described
above, the optimization problem of a student is
u(lt; wt) = l

t w

t ! max
lt
s.t. lt + st = 1
gt = maxfsta  rt; 0g
wt =
8<:
wHt if Rt(rt)  R and gt  gt
wLt if Rt(rt)  R and gt < gt
0 if Rt(rt) < R
;  > 0
As it was mentioned earlier, lt and st denote leisure and studying time, respectively, gt is
the grade, and wt is the wage. Given the university requirements, rt, a grade gt is obtained if
a student with ability a studies for st units of time. The student is employed only if the rank
condition holds and then the wage is either wHt if the students grade is above the threshold
gt set by the employer, or wLt if the grade is below this threshold.
4.4 Equilibrium
Equilibrium in period t is a standard symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium, where all
decision makers achieve their objectives subject to the constraints they face and the beliefs of
the employers are a) the same, b) "correct" on the equilibrium path, that is, conrmed by the
rational choices of high- and low-ability students. Formally, equilibrium is the combination
of requirements rt set by the university, the beliefs and the wage contract of the employers
and studying times st chosen by students with all abilities a 2 (rt; a] such that:
1. the size of the student pool, Nt, is maximized subject to Nt  Nt 1(rt 1) + a a and
Rt(rt)  R;
2. the employers beliefs on the equilibrium path are correct, i.e. consistent with the
choices of students. If the corresponding wage contract is separating, workers with
ability above A receive the wage wHt, workers with ability below A receive the wage
wLt and both wages are determined via Bertrand competition between the employers;
if the wage contract is pooling, all workers receive the same xed wage, determined via
Bertrand competition;
3. the utility of any student with ability a 2 (rt; a] is maximized given the employers
beliefs (on and o¤ the equilibrium path), wage contract, the university requirements
and the denition of a grade, gt = maxfsta  rt; 0g;
4. the beliefs of the employers o¤ the equilibrium path are arbitrary.
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Below we characterize the equilibrium in any period t  2.14 As we will demonstrate,
this equilibrium is unique.The equilibrium of the entire model is then dened as a situation
where in each t  2 the SPBE of is played.
5 Results
In the following assume for the sake of simplicity that abilities of students are distributed
uniformly on [a; a], so that f is the p.d.f. of the uniform distribution, f(a) = 1
a a on [a; a].
Then the c.d.f. is F (a) = a a
a a for a 2 (a; a] (0 below a and 1 above a) and the truncated
p.d.f. eft with the support on the interval (rt; a] for a  rt < a is dened as
eft(a) = f(a)
F (a)  F (rt) =
1
a  a  1=

1  rt   a
a  a

=
1
a  rt
Our rst proposition states that as soon as the threshold A, separating high- and low-
ability students is high enough, the beliefs of the employers and the corresponding separating
wage contract of the type described above are in fact equilibrium beliefs and contracts in
any period t.
Proposition 1 If the threshold of abilities A is su¢ ciently high, then the set of strategies
and employersbeliefs characterized below constitutes an equilibrium at any t  2:
1. The university requirements are dened recursively by rt = maxfrt 1   ; rg, where
r is the unique solution of Rt(rt) = R. Given the initial requirements r1, rt is dened
uniquely in every t  2:
rt = r1   (t  1) if r1   (t  1) > r
rt = r
 otherwise
2. The beliefs of the employers are such that all students with the grade gt  gt are of
high ability (with a  A) and all the other students are of low ability (with a < A),
where the threshold grade, gt, is equal to
gt = A
 
1 

wLt
wHt
 

!
  rt
The corresponding separating wage contract o¤ers the high wage wHt to students with
gt  gt and the low wage wLt to students with gt < gt. The wages, wHt and wLt, are
equal to
wHt =
xH
2
(a+ A)
wLt =
xL
2
(rt + A)
14Recall that period 1 requirements are set exogenously and predetermine the initial size of the student
pool N1.
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3. The studying time of the student of any ability a < A is 0, while the studying time of
the student of any ability a  A is
st =
gt + rt
a
=
A

1 

wLt
wHt
 


a
These studying times lead to gt = 0 and gt = gt, respectively. Both types of students
accept the o¤ered wage contract and earn wages wHt (if of high type) and wLt (if of
low type).
The next proposition states the "uniqueness" result. Namely, it claims that the separating
equilibrium described in Proposition 3.1 is unique and no pooling equilibrium exists.
Proposition 2 At any t  2, there exists no equilibrium in which the wage contract of the
employers is pooling.
The proofs of Proposition 3.1 and 3.2 are provided in the Appendix.
Thus, the unique equilibrium outcome at any time t  2 is such that (a) the university
sets the requirements that are by  lower than the ones in the previous period, as soon as
this level does not fall below the lowest acceptable threshold, r; (b) the employers o¤er the
separating wage contract that allocates high wage to students of high ability and low wage to
students of low ability, and the wages are determined a la Bertrand; (c) the students either
do not study or study just enough to obtain the threshold grade gt and accept the wage
contract of the employers.
It is easy to see that the long-run equilibrium value of requirements is r, the value at
which the rank condition holds as equality, Rt(r) = R. This induces the long-run value of
the threshold grade
g = A
 
1 

wL
wH
 

!
  r = A
 
1 

xL
xH
 


r + A
a+ A
 

!
  r
The long-run studying time of any low-ability student is 0, while long-run studying time of
any high-ability student is
s =
A

1 

wL
wH
 


a
=
A

1 

xL
xH
 
   r+A
a+A
 


a
We are interested in the e¤ects that the university requirements have on equilibrium
studying time, grades and wages. Notice that the equilibrium wage of high-ability students
(with a  A) is constant, una¤ected by rt, while the wage of low-ability students (with
a < A) is increasing in rt, that is, it declines when rt declines. This is so because Bertrand
competition between the employers who have separating beliefs induces them to set wHt
equal to the expected productivity of the high-type students, xHE(a j a  A), and wLt
equal to the expected productivity of the low-type students, xLE(a j rt  a < A). The
former conditional expectation is constant since the pool of high-ability graduates, with
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a  A, remains the same as requirements decline. On the other hand, the latter conditional
expectation moves together with rt: smaller rt leads to a larger pool of low-ability graduates,
hence their expected ability and wage become smaller.
The equilibrium grade of low-ability students is constant and equal to 0, while the equi-
librium grade of high-ability students, gt, increases as requirements become lower.
Finally, the equilibrium studying time of low-ability students remains xed at 0, while the
equilibrium studying time of high-ability students, st, increases as rt declines. The reason
why the studying time of high-ability students increases has to do with the fact that as rt
declines, declining low-to-high wage ratio, wLt
wHt
, creates incentives for low-ability students to
study and receive high wage, i.e. imitate high-ability students. For this not to happen, the
studying time required to earn high wage increases, by just enough to discourage imitation
by low types.
These e¤ects of the requirements on equilibrium studying time, grades and on wages
induce prediction for the e¤ects on the average/expected equilibrium studying time, Avst,
the average/expected equilibrium grade, Avgt, and the average/expected equilibrium wage,
Avwt, of time t cohort of students. Clearly, the average wage declines because the wage
and the number of high-ability students are xed, while the wage of low-ability students
decreases and the number of low-ability students becomes larger.
On the other hand, the e¤ects of declining university requirements on the average grade
and average studying time are not so straightforward. Comparative statics results (derived
in the Appendix) suggest that as the requirements decline, the average grade increases and
the average studying time decreases, with the latter being true at least as soon as (i) the ratio
of productivity factors, xL
xH
, is su¢ ciently low and/or (ii) the ratio of studentspreferences
for leisure or wages 

is su¢ ciently small and high types constitute only a relatively small
proportion of the total student pool. Intuitively, as requirements become weaker, the average
grade increases because the threshold grade, gt, increases and hence, even though the number
of high-ability students remains the same, their grades rise and this turns out to over-
compensate an increase in the pool of low-ability students whose grade is zero. Similarly,
the decline in average studying time is a result of an increase in the number of low-ability
students, whose studying time is zero. This e¤ect turns out to outweigh an increase in the
studying time of high-ability students, at least as soon as the impact of the declining low-to-
high wage ratio (that increases st) is muted by low productivity factors ratio, xLxH , and/or if
studentspreferences allocate su¢ ciently higher weight to leisure than to wages (so that st
of high-ability students does not increase much) and high types constitute only a relatively
small proportion of the total student pool.15
The proposition below summarizes these conclusions:
Proposition 3 The equilibrium of the model is characterized by the following comparative
statics:
1. The equilibrium wage of high-ability students, wHt, is constant, independent of rt, while
the equilibrium wage of low-ability students, wLt, decreases when rt declines.
15Notice that the restriction on A to be su¢ ciently high has been actually imposed already earlier, in
order to guarantee the existence of the separating equilibrium in this model.
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2. The equilibrium studying time of low-ability students is xed at 0, while the equilibrium
studying time of high-ability students increases when rt declines. As more low-ability
students enter university, the increased studying time of the high ability students will
not compensate the growing number of low ability students and average studying time
will decline.
3. The equilibrium grade of low-ability students is xed at 0, while the equilibrium grade
of high-ability students increases when rt declines.
4. The average equilibrium wage, Avwt, decreases and the average equilibrium grade, Avgt,
increases when rt declines. The average equilibrium studying time, Avst, decreases at
least as soon as (i) xL
xH
is su¢ ciently small and/or (ii) 

is su¢ ciently small and A is
su¢ ciently large.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we constructed a theory on how the expansion of higher education could be
associated with several factors that indicate a decline in the quality of degrees. We focused on
how the expansion of higher education together with a decrease in university requirements
resulting from budgetary considerations might be associated with a decline in average
studying time (student e¤ort), grade ination and a decrease in average wages provided to
university graduates. We constructed a model in which a university, multiple employers and
a student play a dynamic game with incomplete information. This model can be interpreted
as an extension of the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Stiglitz (1975) model of screening in
which the employer needs to employ a mechanism to sort employees into high-performing or
low-performing workers. Other previous theoretical models also form the basis of our model:
universities are modelled as non-for-prot organisations in which managers are interested in
expanding their institutions.
By the means of our model we show that studentsaverage studying time, average wages
as well as the signalling power of grades decline because college enrolment rates increase
beyond a level, at which academic requirements can be kept at a high level. In our model the
expansion of education reduces average studying time because expansion is modelled as low-
ability expansion (the number of low-ability students accepted to university, whose optimal
studying time is shown to be zero, is shown to increasewhile the number of high ability
students stays the same). Machin and McNally (2007:11) already raise this possibility. This
is the case because(1) college academic requirements decrease as a consequence of universities
setting requirements so as to maximise the pool of students, (2) all students are better o¤ if
they get accepted to a university with a high rank and (3) employers award a high wage to
those with a high grade.
Our model shows that under these circumstances, the grade will not necessarily act as
a mechanism to induce weaker students to study and catch up with more able students. In
order to re-establish a quality guarantee mechanism, entrance requirements should be set at
a higher level.
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Appendix
Proofs
The proofs of both propositions below are analogous to proofs of the existence and uniqueness
of the separating equilibrium in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).
Proof of Proposition 3.1
First, suppose that Rt  R and consider the optimal choice of students with any ability
a 2 (rt; a], given the employersbeliefs and the o¤ered wage contract. Students with abilities
below and above A will select their studying time, st, so that their utility is maximized.
First, observe that the minimal studying time needed to obtain the threshold grade gt is
st =
gt + rt
a
Then the student who chooses st < st will actually set st = 0 (and receive gt = 0) because
the grade is costly and until it reaches st, there are no benets to increasing st, given the
employerswage contract. Similarly, any student who chooses st  st will in fact set st = st
(and receive gt = gt), since further increases would merely incur costs with no corresponding
benets. Everyone will therefore set either st = 0 or st = st.
Given the wage contract and the fact just deduced, if the employersbeliefs are to be
consistent, then students with ability a < A must set st = 0, while students with ability
a  A must set st = st. To make sure that this is the case and the threshold grade gt does
separate a  A and a < A, it needs to be such that the incentive-compatibility constraints
hold for any a 2 (rt; a]. In other words, the low-ability types should have no incentives to
imitate the high-ability types and the other way round. Namely, it must be that
u(1  st; wHt) > u(1; wLt) for any a  A
u(1; wLt) > u(1  st; wHt) for any a < A
that is, 
1  gt + rt
a

wHt > 1  wLt for any a  A
1  wLt >

1  gt + rt
a

wHt for any a < A
Both inequalities are fullled if and only if at a = A they hold as equalities:16
1  gt + rt
A

wHt = 1  wLt
This equality identies gt uniquely for any given wLt, wHt, A and rt:
gt = A
 
1 

wLt
wHt
 

!
  rt
16Since with continuously distributed abilities a = A has measure 0, the fact that for a = A the inequality
is not strict "does not matter". This is so in a sense that the probability that a student with ability A prefers
to not study and obtain low wage the behavior associated with a < Ais zero.
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Now, the proof of the equilibrium still requires (1) to show that as long as A is su¢ ciently
high, no pooling contract chosen by the competitive employer can break the candidate sepa-
rating equilibrium, (2) to nd the equilibrium wages, (3) to specify the equilibrium strategy
of the university. Consider each of these points in turn.
(1) Notice that in equilibrium Bertrand competition over wages results in zero prots for
each employer. Consider the deviation by one of the employers to the pooling wage
contract that is the best (among all pooling contracts) for the students and allows the
employer to make positive prots. This best pooling contract o¤ers the single wage
that is equal to the average/expected wage in the whole population of students (minus
small " > 0), and this wage is paid to a student with any grade gt  0. The average
wage is equal to
Avwt =
Z A
rt
wLt eft(a)da+ Z a
A
wHt eft(a)da = wLt(A  rt)
a  rt +
wHt(a  A)
a  rt = (2)
=
wHta  wLtrt   A(wHt   wLt)
a  rt (3)
We show that even this best pooling contract cannot be accepted by both types of
students, high- and low-ability, as soon as A is su¢ ciently high. Indeed, at least some
high-ability students will not accept this contract if
u(1; Avwt) < u(1  st; wHt) for somea  A
or

wHta  wLtrt   A(wHt   wLt)
a  rt

<
0BBB@1 
A

1 

wLt
wHt
 


a
1CCCA

wHt for somea  A
It is easy to see that this condition holds for any wHt > wLt if A = a and a > A. So,
for A large enough, high-ability students do not accept the pooling contract and prefer
the separating contract instead. Then the deviation to the pooling wage contract is
not protable, and the candidate separating wage contract is an equilibrium.
(2) With separating wage contract, the expected prot of each employer from employing
a high-ability student is equal to
E(t j a  A) = xHE(a j a  A)  wHt
Similarly, the expected prot from employing a low-ability student is equal to
E(t j rt  a < A) = xLE(a j rt  a < A)  wLt
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Both employers have the same technology, hence, the standard Bertrand argument
leads to zero prots and
wHt = xHE(a j a  A) = xH
Z a
A
a
1
a  Ada =
xH
2
(a+ A)
wLt = xLE(a j rt  a < A) = xL
Z A
rt
a
1
A  rtda =
xL
2
(rt + A)
where 1
a A and
1
A rt are the truncated probability density functions with the support
on [A; a] and (rt; A), respectively.
(3) Finally, consider the optimal choice of requirements by the university at time t. Given
the objective of the university to increase its funds by maximizing the pool of students,
the university reduces the requirements by "as much as possible" since this maximizes
Nt =
R a
rt
f(a)da = a rt
a a . Therefore, as soon as requirements are above r
, the level at
which the rank condition just holds, the university cuts them back.
Notice that the level of requirements r exists and is unique. Indeed, consider that
using the expression for the average wage in (2) and the expression for Nt, the rank of
the university at time t can be written as:
Rt(rt) = 
T
a rt
a a
+ rt + 
wHta  wLtrt   A(wHt   wLt)
a  rt +  =
= 
T (a  a)
(a  rt) + rt + 
wHta  wLtrt   A(wHt   wLt)
a  rt + 
All terms in the sum (apart from ) are increasing in rt, that is, the rank of the university
moves together with the requirements. Therefore, the lowest level of requirements for which
the rank condition holds is such that Rt(rt) = R. Due to the fact that Rt(rt) is monotonically
increasing in rt and R satises (1), there exists a unique solution of Rt(rt) = R in (a; r1),
which we denote by r.
So, for any t  2 as soon as rt 1 < r (r1 < r due to the second inequality in (1)) the
optimal strategy of the university is to set
rt = maxfrt 1  ; rg
rt = rt 1   guarantees that Nt = Nt 1(rt 1) + a a , i.e. the quota of students at time t is
used fully and the number of students at t is maximized:
a  rt
a  a =
a  rt 1
a  a +

a  a
rt = rt 1  
On the other hand, if rt 1 = r, then the requirements are not adjusted anymore.17
17In particular, this means that r is the long-run value of the university requirements at which the rank
condition is just satised.
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Proof of Proposition 3.2
Consider the candidate pooling equilibrium. The best (for the students) pooling wage
contract o¤ers the wage that is equal to the average/expected wage in the whole population
of students (see (2)), paid irrespectively of a students grade. The prots of both employers
are zero.
Below we show that there exists another contract such that the deviation by any of the
employers to this contract is protable. Consider the contract that o¤ers wt = wHt (minus
small " > 0) if gt  bgt and wt = wLt if gt < bgt for some bgt > 0. We prove that there existsbgt such that this contract is accepted by high-ability students but rejected by low-ability
students, so that the deviating employer raises positive prots.
The contract is accepted by high-ability students, who choose the studying time bst = bgt+rta
(just enough to receive the grade bgt) as soon as
u(1; Avwt) < u(1  bst; wHt) for any a  A
Equivalently,
wHta  wLtrt   A(wHt   wLt)
a  rt

<

1  bgt + rt
a

wHt for any a  A (4)
On the other hand, the contract is rejected by low-ability students, who choose the
pooling wage contract with st = 0 (and gt = 0), as soon as
u(1; Avwt) > u(1  bst; wHt) for any a < A
Equivalently,
wHta  wLtrt   A(wHt   wLt)
a  rt

<

1  bgt + rt
a

wHt for any a < A (5)
Both conditions, (4) and (5) are satised if and only if they hold as equality at a = A.
Solving this equality for bgt produces
bgt = A 1  wHta  wLtrt   A(wHt   wLt)
(a  rt)wHt
 

!
  rt
Hence, the deviating contract breaks the candidate pooling equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3.3
We only need to prove part 4 of the proposition. Namely, we need to study the e¤ect of
rt on Avgt and Avst. First, notice that
Avgt =
Z a
A
gt eft(a)da = gt Z a
A
1
a  rtda = gt
a  A
a  rt =
"
A
 
1 

xL
xH
 


rt + A
a+ A
 

!
  rt
#
a  A
a  rt
Avst =
Z a
A
st eft(a)da = Z a
A
gt + rt
a
1
a  rtda =
Z a
A
A

1 

wLt
wHt
 


a
1
a  rtda =
=
A

1 

wLt
wHt
 


a  rt (lna  lnA) =
A

1 

xL
xH
 
   rt+A
a+A
 


a  rt (lna  lnA)
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Consider the partial derivatives of Avgt and Avst with respect to rt and evaluate their sign.
Simple algebra leads to
@Avgt
@rt
=
a  A
(a  rt)2
"
A

xL
xH
 


rt + A
a+ A
 


 

rt + A
a+ A

  

a  rt
a+ A

+ A  a
#
< 0
@Avst
@rt
=
(rt + A)
 

(a  rt)2
A (lna  lnA)
(a+ A)


"
a+ A
rt + A
 

(rt + A) 

xL
xH
 

(rt + A)  


xL
xH
 

(a  rt)
#
The sign of @Avst
@rt
is positive, at least as soon as (i) xL
xH
is su¢ ciently small and/or (ii) 

is
su¢ ciently small and A is su¢ ciently large.
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